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A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE BURDEN OF PROOF
AS TO TRUTH OR FALSITY UNDER MISSOURI DEFAMATION
LAW: KENNEY v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.

AARON L. PAWLITZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to clarify the
following issue of confusion under Missouri defamation law: Does the
defendant bear the burden of proof as to the truth of the defamatory statement
as an affirmative defense or does the plaintiff bear the burden of proof as to the
falsity of the statement as an element of the cause of action? In Kenney v. WalMart Stores, Inc., a jury instruction used at trial did not require the plaintiff to
prove the falsity of the defamatory statement.1 On appeal, the appellate court
recognized that the Missouri Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion in Overcast v.
Billings Mutual Insurance Co. listed proof of falsity as one of the elements of
the cause of action for defamation.2 The clash between the instruction and the
law was not a run-of-the-mill instruction error, though, for the instruction used
was published in Missouri Approved Instructions (“MAI”), the State’s
mandatory jury instructions.3 In Kenney, the Supreme Court had an
* Associate Attorney, Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., St. Louis, Missouri; J.D., Saint Louis
University School of Law; B.A., University of Missouri at St. Louis. My familiarity with Kenney
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and the issues discussed herein arose initially from my contribution to a
brief amicus curiae that Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C. submitted to the Missouri Supreme Court
in Kenney on behalf of St. Louis Post-Dispatch, LLC. I am grateful to Nathan E. Ross for his
comments on an early draft of this article. The views expressed herein are not necessarily those
of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C. or the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, LLC. Any shortcomings are my
responsibility.
1. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. WD 59936, 2002 WL 1991158, at *7 (Mo. Ct.
App. W.D. Aug. 30, 2002).
2. Id. at *6; see Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
3. See April 8, 2002 Order of the Missouri Supreme Court, cited in MISSOURI APPROVED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (6th ed. 2002) (“The aforesaid forms must be used on and after January 1,
2003 . . . .”); MO. R. CIV. P. 70.02(b) (“Whenever Missouri Approved Instructions contains an
instruction applicable . . . such instruction shall be given to the exclusion of any other instructions
on the same subject.”) (emphasis added); Stalcup v. Orthotic & Prosthetic Lab, Inc., 989 S.W.2d
654, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Use of Missouri Approved Instructions is mandatory in any case
where the instructions apply.”) (citing Smith v. Kovac, 927 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996)).
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opportunity to evaluate the mandatory instruction and the caselaw as
competing sources of law, and eliminate the confusion over the burden of
proof as to truth or falsity under Missouri’s defamation law.4
Ultimately, the Missouri Supreme Court did not decide the issue of the
burden of proof as to truth or falsity.5 The court reversed and remanded for a
new trial,6 and based its ruling, on the improper modification of a MAI
instruction related to the prerequisite of actual reputational damage and on the
insufficiency of proof of actual harm.7 The court acknowledged the confusion
regarding the issue of the burden of proof but, as discussed herein, its
discussion simply may have created further confusion.8
This Article describes the current state of the law with respect to the
burden of proof as to truth or falsity for defamation claims under Missouri law
in the context of the Missouri Supreme Court’s recent opportunity to consider
the matter in Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The Kenney procedural and
factual histories are set forth at Part II. Part III’s rough outline of relevant First
Amendment jurisprudence provides the context for a description of Missouri’s
defamation law, which is set forth at Part IV. Part V analyzes the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Kenney, and the Conclusion, at Part VI, outlines a few
practical consequences of the Supreme Court’s failure to clear up the issue of
which party bears the burden of proof as to truth or falsity.
II. KENNEY FACTS
The facts underlying the appellate court’s ruling arose from a child custody
dispute that sparked, flared, and extinguished over the course of Labor Day
weekend in 1996.9 Beginning Friday, August 30, sixteen-month-old Lauren
Kenney was to spend the weekend with her father, Christopher Kenney.
Christopher Kenney and Lauren’s mother, Angela Mueller, were not married
and did not live together. Lauren resided with Angela, and although Lauren’s

4. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SC 84770, 2003 WL 1711949 (Mo. Apr. 1, 2003)
(en banc). Arguably, there is little to evaluate. It is well-settled that the law prevails over an
MAI, as the Kenney appellate court noted. See Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6 (citing Letz v.
Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).
5. Kenney, 2003 WL 1711949, at *4 n.2 (“This Court does not address the issue here and
leaves it unresolved.”). The court justified its failure to decide the issue on its policy of avoiding
constitutional issues where a case could be determined on other grounds. Id. (citing State ex rel.
Union Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
6. Id. at *8 (“Though Ms. Kenney may face substantial obstacles in meeting her burden of
proof on retrial, this Court cannot say that it is impossible for her to present a submissible case.”).
7. Id. at *3 (noting the court needed only to address the submitted verdict director and the
sufficiency of proof of actual damage).
8. Id. at *4 n.2.
9. See Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *2. The facts set forth herein are drawn from the
appellate court’s opinion. See id. at *1-3.
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visits with Christopher were common, there was no court order mandating a
visitation schedule or otherwise establishing custody.
Lauren’s paternal grandmother, Carolyn Kenney, retrieved Lauren from
Angela’s home on the afternoon of August 30 and took Lauren to visit
Christopher where he worked. Christopher and Angela had agreed that Lauren
would be returned to Angela’s home two days later, on September 1. The
same day Lauren was retrieved from Angela, because Christopher believed
Angela was planning to take Lauren to Georgia soon—possibly to live
permanently—he filed a petition to establish Lauren’s custody in Clay County
Circuit Court. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for Tuesday,
September 3, just four days later. Because Christopher suspected that Angela
might depart with Lauren to Georgia before the hearing if he returned Lauren
to Angela before the hearing (as they had previously agreed), he left the
Kansas City area and took Lauren to Lake of the Ozarks in central Missouri.
Although Christopher called Angela to inform her that he would not be
returning Lauren on September 1 as originally planned, he refused to disclose
where the child would be. Carolyn Kenney accompanied her son and
granddaughter to Lake of the Ozarks.
Later that weekend, Angela prepared and circulated a missing child poster
which set forth the circumstances of Lauren’s “disappearance.” The posters
described Lauren’s appearance, stated that Lauren was in the custody of her
father and grandmother, and displayed a picture of Carolyn Kenney. One of
the posters found its way into a locked display case at Wal-Mart’s Lee’s
Summit, Missouri store, which featured posters circulated by the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children. No Wal-Mart employee
authorized the placement of the poster within the display case. Although a
Wal-Mart manager was informed that the poster was false on September 1,
Wal-Mart’s managers were unable to remove the poster at that time because
they could not locate the key to unlock the display case.
At the same time the poster was discovered in Wal-Mart’s display case,
Angela approached the Kansas City Police Department and KSHB-TV 41, and
she asked them to help her locate Lauren. The police issued a pick-up order,
and the television station aired a report about Lauren.10 On September 2,
Christopher and Carolyn Kenney returned to Kansas City with Lauren, and the
custody hearing was conducted the next day. Christopher and Carolyn Kenney
10. The television report contained the following language:
Police are on the lookout for a missing girl who may have been abducted by a relative. Sixteenmonth-old Lauren Kenney is pictured here with her mother. The child was last seen Friday
afternoon when she left her house with her paternal grandmother, Carolyn Kenney. Family
members believe the girl’s father and grandmother are now with her at an unknown location.
Lauren has curly hair and hazel eyes, she is two feet five inches tall, and sixteen months old. If
you have any information, please call the Juvenile Division of the Kansas City Police Department
or your local law enforcement agency. Id. at *3.
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delivered Lauren to Angela after the circuit court’s determination that primary
custody should be awarded to Angela.
Nearly two years after the Labor Day Weekend custody battle, Carolyn
Kenney brought a defamation action against Wal-Mart for its role in the
publication of the allegedly false information about her role in Lauren’s
“abduction.”11 A Jackson County jury rendered a verdict for Carolyn and
awarded her $33,750 in actual damages and nearly $400,000 in punitive
damages.12
Wal-Mart appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Missouri Court of
Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict
and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.13 The appellate court
held that the trial court erred by submitting to the jury an instruction that failed
to require a finding of falsity of the defamatory statement.14 Such an
instruction, the court held, was in conflict with the Missouri Supreme Court’s
holding in Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co.,15 which identified falsity
as an element of a cause of action for defamation.16 Due to the significance of
the issues, the appellate court transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme
Court.17
III. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT’S DEFAMATION JURISPRUDENCE
At common law, a defamation plaintiff did not need to prove the falsity of
the defamatory statement to prevail—the falsity of the communication was
presumed.18 A defendant could overcome this presumption, however, if he
proved the truth of the statement.19 Since 1964, the United States Supreme
Court’s defamation rulings have departed from the common law’s substantive
standard of fault and procedural burdens regarding falsity.20
The Supreme Court first constitutionalized defamation21 in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.22 There, the Court held that a public-official plaintiff
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *1.
14. Id. at *10-11.
15. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
16. Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6; Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70.
17. Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *13.
18. ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 46
(2d ed. 1994).
19. Id.
20. See also id.
21. See id. at 1 (“Since 1964, the history of the law of defamation has in large measure been
the history of the establishment of First Amendment doctrine to govern the torts of libel and
slander . . . .”).
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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must prove “actual malice” to prevail in a libel action.23 Because a defendant
needed only to prove the truth of the libelous publication to prevail at common
law,24 the Court’s decision in Sullivan represented a significant step toward
greater protection of speech. The Sullivan decision not only altered
defamation claims procedurally, by requiring the plaintiff to prove falsity
rather than the defendant, but also substantively, by elevating the standard for
liability from mere negligence to the more rigorous actual malice standard.25
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Supreme Court went one step further and
extended the requirement that plaintiffs prove actual malice to public figures
other than public officials.26
With respect to private figures, the Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., ruled that such plaintiffs must prove that a defendant was at least
negligent to recover actual damages and that the defendant acted with actual
malice to recover punitive damages.27 Until 1986, the requirement that a
defendant had to prove the truth of the defamatory statement in a defamation
action brought by a private-figure plaintiff remained unchanged. The Court’s
decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, however, reversed the
common law burden and required private-figure plaintiffs prove the falsity of
the defamatory statement.28 Justice O’Connor’s opinion limited this holding to
the facts of the case, which involved a media-entity defendant being sued over
a matter of public concern.29 Although Justice Brennan’s concurrence
questioned the logic of not protecting the speech of non-media-entity
defendants just as much as the speech of media-entity defendants,30 the Court
has not extended the requirement that plaintiffs prove the falsity of the
defamatory statement beyond the narrow facts of Hepps.

23. Id. at 279-80. “Actual malice” is fault beyond negligence. See Overcast v. Billings Mut.
Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (“‘Actual malice’ is defined as a false statement
made ‘with knowledge that it was false, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false
at a time when defendant had serious doubt as to whether it was true.’”) (citing Snodgrass v.
Headco Indus., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)).
24. C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of
Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 245 (1993).
25. SACK & BARON, supra note 18, at 46 (“[The Supreme Court’s] holding that public
plaintiffs must prove ‘actual malice’ . . . to recover for defamation implied that such plaintiffs
must also bear the burden of establishing falsity, contrary to the common law scheme.”).
26. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). Throughout this article, public officials and non-official
public figures will collectively be referred to as “public figures.”
27. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
28. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
29. Id. at 779 n.4. MAI recognizes the media-/non-media-entity distinction created by
Hepps. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
30. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 779-80.
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IV. MISSOURI LIBEL LAW
Missouri’s libel law, as expressed in its mandatory jury instructions,
MAI,31 is generally in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s holdings
with respect to defamation.32 For instance, the verdict-directing instruction
designated for claims brought by public figures and public officials, MAI
23.06(2), requires a finding that the libelous statement was false:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant (describe act such as “published a newspaper article”)
containing the statement (here insert the statement claimed to be libelous
such as “plaintiff was a convicted felon”), and
Second, such a statement was false, and
Third, defendant (describe the act of publication such as “published such
statement”, “wrote such letter”, etc.) either:
with knowledge that it was false, or
with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false at a time when
defendant had serious doubt as to whether it was true, and
Fourth, such statement tended to [expose plaintiff to (select appropriate term
or terms such as “hatred,” “contempt,” or “ridicule”)] [or] [deprive the
plaintiff of the benefit of public confidence and social associations], and
Fifth, such statement was read by (here insert the name of person or persons
other than plaintiff or the appropriate generic term such as “the public”),
and
Sixth, plaintiff’s reputation was thereby damaged.33

This instruction comports with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Sullivan.34
The instruction designated for libel claims brought by private-figure
plaintiffs, however, differs from the United States Supreme Court’s current
defamation precedent. The Missouri “verdict-directing” instruction for such
claims, MAI 23.06(1), fails to require that such plaintiffs prove the falsity of
the libelous statement:

31. See supra note 3 (discussing mandatory nature of MAI instructions).
32. See MAI 23.06(1); MAI 23.06(2); see also MAI 23.10(1) [1980 New] (slander action
brought by private figure); MAI 23.10(2) [1980 New] (slander action brought by public figure).
33. MAI 23.06(2).
34. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25 (discussing Sullivan).
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Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant (describe act such as “published a newspaper article”)
containing the statement (here insert the statement claimed to be libelous
such as “plaintiff was a convicted felon”), and
Second, defendant was at fault in publishing such statement, and
Third, such statement tended to [expose plaintiff to (select appropriate term or
terms such as “hatred,” “contempt” or “ridicule”)] [or] [deprive the
plaintiff of the benefit of public confidence and social associations], and
Fourth, such statement was read by (here insert name of person or persons
other than plaintiff or the appropriate generic term, such as “the public”),
and
Fifth, plaintiff’s reputation was thereby damaged.35

Such an instruction and its failure to require the plaintiff to prove falsity of
the allegedly defamatory statement contradicts Hepps, which required that, at
least in an action against a media-entity defendant over a matter of public
concern, a plaintiff bears the burden of proof as to the falsity of the defamatory
statement.36 The authors of MAI attempted to bring MAI 23.06(1) into
conformance with Hepps’ holding, but did so through a Committee Comment
which accompanied a 1990 revision to the instructions. Specifically, this
Comment suggests that a paragraph requiring the plaintiff to prove the falsity
of the libelous statement be inserted into MAI 23.06(1), but only when the
plaintiff was suing a media defendant about a matter of public concern:
In [Hepps], a narrow opinion limited to a private plaintiff suing a media
defendant for libel in a matter of public concern, the court shifted the burden of
proof on truth-falsity to the plaintiff. Concurring justices would have extended
the shift in similar cases against any defendant. Paragraph Second in MAI
23.06(2) already imposes the burden [of proving falsity] on a public official
plaintiff. Prudence would suggest that such a paragraph Second should be
included in MAI 23.06(1) when a private plaintiff is suing a media defendant
on a publication of public concern.37

The Committee Comment merits discussion for at least two reasons. First,
the Comment is poorly placed. From its location in the materials following
MAI 23.06(2) (the verdict-directing instruction for suits brought by publicfigure plaintiffs), it dictates a course of action with respect to MAI 23.06(1),
the verdict-director for suits brought by private-figure plaintiffs. Of more
significance, though, is that the Comment endorses a strange view—that
35. MAI 23.06(1). The verdict-directing instruction for slander claims, found at MAI 23.10
(1), also fails to require the plaintiff to prove falsity. See MAI 23.10(1).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (discussing Hepps).
37. MAI 23.06(2) Committee Comment (1990 Revision).
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speech should be afforded more or less protection based on the identity of the
speaker.38
The contrast between MAI 23.06(1) and MAI 23.06(2) demonstrates that
Missouri has adopted the distinction between private-figure and public-figure
plaintiffs initially endorsed in Sullivan.39 The Missouri Supreme Court’s
recent opinion in Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co.,40 however, adds a
wrinkle to this landscape. There, the court included falsity of the defamatory
statement as an element of the cause of action to be proved by a private-figure
plaintiff in a defamation action against a non-media-entity defendant.41 As the
Kenney appellate court opinion recognized,42 the Overcast opinion’s inclusion
of falsity as an element contradicted the absence of such a requirement in MAI
23.06(1).43
When the Missouri Supreme Court considered Kenney, the clash between
MAI 23.06(1) and the Overcast opinion’s enumeration of defamation elements
meant the defamation waters in Missouri were running a bit muddier than
usual. In Kenney, the court had an opportunity to clear up matters by either
restating the elements of a defamation action brought by a private-figure
plaintiff (and thereby implicitly overruling anything in Overcast to the
contrary) or by rewriting, amending, or otherwise providing guidance that
would harmonize MAI 23.06(1) with the expression of the defamation
elements found in Overcast.
V. THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN KENNEY V. WAL-MART
STORES, INC.
The entirety of the Supreme Court’s consideration of the burden of proof
issue in its Kenney opinion was expressed in the few lines of Footnote 2:

38. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court considered whether certain political speech was entitled to less protection because
the speaker was a corporation. In the majority opinion, Justice Powell explained that the political
speech at issue was “the type of speech indispensable to . . . a democracy,” and that this was no
less true simply because the speech came “from a corporation rather than an individual.” Id. at
777. “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public,” Justice
Powell continued, “does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.” Id.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25 (discussing Sullivan).
40. 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
41. Id. at 70 (“[E]lements of defamation in Missouri are: 1) publication, 2) of a defamatory
statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with the requisite
degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff’s reputation.”) (citing Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll.,
860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
42. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. WD 59936, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6 (Mo. Ct.
App. W.D. Aug. 30, 2002).
43. See supra text accompanying note 35 (setting forth MAI 23.06(1)).
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Wal-Mart also raised whether “truth” is an affirmative defense to be proved by
the defendant, or “falsity” is an element of the cause of action to be proved by
the plaintiff. Language in our recent cases of Nazeri v. Missouri Valley
College and [Overcast] suggest different answers to this issue, although neither
case addressed the issue expressly. The resolution of this issue has
constitutional dimensions. “A court will avoid the decision of a constitutional
question if the case can be fully determined without reaching it.” This Court
does not address the issue here and leaves it unresolved.44

Thus, the court acknowledged the current confusion about which party bears
the burden of proof as to the truth or falsity of the defamatory statement, but it
placed the blame on its interpretation of Nazeri45 and Overcast. This differs
from the reasoning of the appellate court, which considered the clash between
the applicable MAI’s and the Overcast opinion’s recitations of the elements of
defamation as a source of confusion.46 A glance at Nazeri and Overcast will
illuminate the foundation of the Supreme Court’s observation that there is
uncertainty regarding the burden of proof as to truth or falsity.
A.

Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College

In Nazeri, following the dismissal of her petition, the plaintiff appealed her
claims of slander, prima facie tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
tortious interference with business relationship, and invasion of privacy.47 In
its discussion of Nazeri’s slander claims, the court clarified the law with
respect to the existence of the slander per se and slander per quod distinction.48
This distinction underscored the issue of whether a plaintiff was entitled to
damages in a defamation action based on the nature of the defamation.49
The Nazeri court’s consideration of the per se and per quod distinctions
specifically, and its consideration of the defamation claim generally, however,
did not include a discussion of the burden of proof as to truth or falsity of the
defamatory statement.50 The court merely engaged in a review of Missouri’s
prior rejection of the per se/per quod distinction (as evidenced by the thenapplicable slander instructions in MAI),51 and it re-affirmed that Missouri did
44. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SC 84770, 2003 WL 1711949, at *4 n.2 (Mo. Apr.
1, 2003) (citations omitted).
45. Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
46. Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6.
47. Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 306.
48. Id. at 307-15.
49. Id. at 308 (“[s]lander per se encompassed false statements that the plaintiff was guilty of
a crime, afflicted with a loathsome disease, or unchaste . . . [or regarding the plaintiff’s
occupation and in] such cases, the plaintiff was not required to plead damages, as damages were
presumed . . . .”).
50. See id. at 307-15; see also Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6 (“Our reading of Nazeri
does not disclose the laundry list of six proof elements cited in Overcast.”).
51. See Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 310-13.
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not recognize the distinction.52 At no point in its opinion did the Nazeri court
set forth a list of the elements of defamation that excluded proof of falsity.53
B.

Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance, Inc.

In Overcast, the plaintiff brought an action seeking insurance benefits and
recovery for defamation.54 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court for contract damages on the insurance benefits
claim and for actual and punitive damages on the defamation claim.55
Although the burden of proof as to the truth or falsity of the defamatory
statement was not a substantial issue in Overcast, it was, in fact, the Overcast
opinion’s recitation of the elements of defamation that caught the attention of
the Kenney appellate court.56 The Overcast opinion cited Nazeri as support for
its list of the elements of defamation, which include: “1) publication, 2) of a
defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is
published with the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the plaintiff’s
reputation.”57
C. What is the Real Source of the Confusion over Which Party Bears the
Burden of Proof as to Truth or Falsity?
In Kenney, the Missouri Supreme Court attributed confusion as to which
party bears the burden of proof as to the truth or falsity of the defamatory
statement to the opinions in Nazeri and Overcast.58 This attribution is less than
convincing, but in the end, uncertainty remains. The Kenney appellate court
identified a conflict between MAI 23.06(1) and the elements from Overcast as
the source of confusion over which party bears the burden of proof.59 The
appellate court correctly understood the relationship between current Missouri
law and the authority of the instructions contained in MAI, and it ruled that the
use of MAI 23.06(1) was error, because it did not reflect the current state of the
law (as set forth in Overcast).60 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, when
52. Id. at 313 (“Accordingly . . . we believe the abandonment of this distinction as evidenced
by our MAI instructions was and still is correct.”).
53. See generally id. at 307-15; see also supra note 50 (discussing the Kenney appellate
court’s reading of Nazeri).
54. 11 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
55. Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 73.
56. See Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. WD 59936, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6 (Mo. Ct.
App. W.D. Aug. 30, 2002).
57. Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70 (citing Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d 303).
58. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. SC 84770, 2003 WL 1711949, at *4 n.2 (Mo. Apr.
1, 2003) (en banc).
59. Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6.
60. Id. (“[T]he law is well settled that in cases of such conflict, the law is to prevail over the
applicable MAI instruction.”) (citing Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 167
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997)).
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confronted with the source of confusion on the burden of proof issue, chose to
ignore the difference between Overcast and MAI 23.06(1) and relied, instead,
upon different suggestions arising from its opinions in Nazeri and Overcast.61
The claim that a reading of these two cases could support different
outcomes as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant bears the burden as to
truth or falsity is suspect. After all, as described above, the Nazeri opinion at
no point contains language discussing the burden of proof as to truth or falsity,
and at no point advocates placing the burden upon the defendant (as would be
necessary for Nazeri to conflict with Overcast).62 Moreover, Overcast cites
Nazeri as support for its enumeration of the elements of defamation.63 Thus,
although the Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion in Kenney claims conflict
between Nazeri and Overcast on the issue of the burden of proof as to truth or
falsity,64 the Overcast opinion’s citation to Nazeri supports the claim that
Overcast can be harmonized with Nazeri.65
Ultimately, whether a true conflict between Nazeri and Overcast exists is
of little consequence, for what is certain is that the enumeration of defamation
elements in Overcast conflicts with MAI 23.06(1),66 and that there is confusion
regarding the burden of proof.67 It is unfortunate, though, that in the Missouri
Supreme Court’s effort to avoid the issue of the burden of proof as to truth or
falsity, it may have steered lower courts in the wrong direction in their
attempts to resolve this issue before the Missouri Supreme Court does so.
Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court’s failure to acknowledge the basis
upon which the appellate court found error in the trial court’s use of MAI
23.06(1) (namely, its conflict with Overcast’s enumeration of defamation
elements) does little to assist lower courts that may find the Kenney appellate
court’s reasoning persuasive.
The court’s inaction with respect to the burden of proof issue is troubling,
because the question of the burden of proof is almost certain to arise again, and
soon. It may be, in fact, that at the Kenney retrial, the trial judge will need to
choose between a proposed instruction placing the burden of proof as to falsity
on the plaintiff (as the Kenney appellate court advocated based on its
interpretation of Overcast) and a proposed instruction placing the burden of
proof as to truth on the defendant (as the currently-applicable MAI mandates).

61. Kenney, 2003 WL 1711949, at *4 n.2. It seems fundamental that the more recent case
prevails over the earlier case, though. See Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6 (citing State v.
Williams, 9 S.W.3d 3, 12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)).
62. The Kenney appellate court recognized this. See supra note 50 (discussing the Kenney
appellate court’s reading of Nazeri).
63. See Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
64. See Kenney, 2003 WL 1711949, at *4 n.2.
65. See Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 70.
66. See Kenney, 2002 WL 1991158, at *6.
67. See Kenney, 2003 WL 1711949, at *4 n.2.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling in Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
represents a missed opportunity to clarify the elements of the State’s
defamation cause of action. The court’s decision allowing the elements of
Missouri’s defamation action to remain cloudy is unfortunate.
Notwithstanding their basis for leaving the “constitutional” issue for another
day, litigants and lower courts are certain to struggle with basic issues of
pleading, proof, and jury instruction because of the Missouri Supreme Court’s
decision not to decide. When the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately answers
which party bears the burden of proof as to the truth or falsity of defamatory
statements, it will need to reconcile its prior discussions of the elements of
defamation (for instance, from Overcast) with the currently published (though,
because of Overcast, arguably no longer applicable) verdict-directing
instruction for defamation claims brought by private-figure plaintiffs.

